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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case
William Thomas Scott, Jr. appeals from the judgment of conviction finding him
guilty of delivery of a controlled substance within 1,000 feet of a school, following a jury
trial.

Mr. Scott asserts that unobjected to prosecutorial misconduct during closing

arguments, including repeated indirect references to his failure to testify at trial, violated
his Fifth Amendment right to remain silent, constituted fundamental error, and must
result in the reversal of his conviction.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
Mr. Scott was charged with delivery of a controlled substance within 1,000 feet of
a school (R., pp.65-66), following a controlled drug buy conducted by confidential
informant Theresa Staker. 1 Ms. Staker had entered into an agreement to act as a
confidential informant after being charged with "[p]ossession with intent to deliver"
methamphetamine.

In exchange for becoming a confidential informant, the State

reduced her charge to possession and allowed her to participate in drug court. Acting in
her capacity as an informant, Ms. Staker telephoned Mr. Scott, and arranged to
purchase one-sixteenth of an ounce of methamphetamine2 for "about [$]150."
Ms. Staker met with Mr. Scott, and received a bag of what she believed was
methamphetamine. 3 (Tr., p.48, L.2-p.73, L.13, p.79, L.13-p.82, L.5.)

1

Ms. Staker was called to testify at trial, and, as such, her identity is no longer
confidential.
2
Ms. Staker testified that she didn't actually request a specific drug, explaining, "I didn't
exactly say [what type of drug], but it was implied." (Tr., p.57, Ls.8-10.)
3
Mr. Scott continues to dispute his guilt as to the charged offense; this version of
events is based on the trial testimony of Ms. Staker.
1

No one other than Ms. Staker witnessed the transaction to which she testified
(Supp.Tr.

4

,

p.33, L.1 - p.34, L.2 (prosecutor acknowledging that no one other than

Ms. Staker testified to having seen Mr. Scott in the car involved in the delivery);
Tr., p.105, Ls.15-17 (Detective Bell testifying that he "was unable to see a transaction");
Tr., p.124, Ls.4-6 (Detective Horak testifying that he didn't recall seeing the suspect's
vehicle during his surveillance)), although officers did recover a bag of suspected
methamphetamine from her car following the purported transaction. 5 (Tr., p.66, Ls.618.) The location of the purported transaction was within 1,000 feet of a junior high
school. (Tr., p.155, Ls.2-9.)
Mr. Scott neither presented any defense witnesses nor testified on his own
behalf. (Tr., p.199, L.24 - p.200, L.1.) In closing argument, the State six times referred
to its case as undisputed or uncontradicted. (Supp.Tr., p.29, L.9 - p.37, L.2.) In closing
argument, defense counsel argued that the State had not proven its case beyond a
reasonable doubt, especially in light of Ms. Staker's interest, pursuant to her
cooperation agreement, in seeing Mr. Scott convicted.
L.20.)

(Supp.Tr., p.37, L.5 - p.43,

In its rebuttal closing argument, the State made two more references to the

evidence not being contradicted.

(Supp.Tr., p.50, Ls.5-7.)

The jury found Mr. Scott

guilty of delivery of a controlled substance and that the delivery occurred within 1,000
feet of a school. (R., pp.283-84.)
The State requested that Mr. Scott receive a unified sentence of ten or twelve
years, with five years fixed. (Tr., p.210, Ls.7-10.) Defense counsel requested that the

4

Supp.Tr. refers to the transcripts of the hearing on Mr. Scott's motion to modify the
plea agreement and of closing arguments, which was prepared following Mr. Scott's
Motion to Augment and Suspend.
5
The substance was later confirmed, through laboratory testing, to be
methamphetamine. (Tr., p.43, Ls.8-11.)
2

district court impose the mandatory five-year-fixed sentence, or, in the alternative, a
unified sentence of seven or eight years, with five years fixed. (Tr., p.211, Ls.17-24.)
Ultimately, the district court imposed a unified sentence of ten years, with five years
fixed. (Tr., p.216, Ls.8-15.) Mr. Scott filed a Notice of Appeal timely from the Judgment
of Conviction and Order. (R., p.303.)

3

ISSUE
Did the State's arguments - eight times - that its evidence was uncontradicted or
undisputed constitute fundamental error in violation of Mr. Scott's Fifth Amendment right
not to testify?

4

ARGUMENT
The State's Arguments - Eight Times - That Its Evidence Was Uncontradicted Or
Undisputed Constituted Fundamental Error In Violation Of Mr. Scott's Fifth Amendment
Right Not To Testify
A.

Introduction
"[T]he Fifth Amendment ... forbids either comment by the prosecution on the

accused's silence or instructions by the court that such silence is evidence of guilt."
Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 615 (1965). "Indirect references to the defendant's

failure to testify are constitutionally impermissible if 'the language used was manifestly
intended to be or was of such a character that the jury would naturally and necessarily
take it to be a comment on the defendant's failure to testify."' Williams v. Lane, 826
F.2d 654,664 (ih Cir. 1987) (quoting U.S. v. Lyon, 397 F.2d 505, 509 (ih Cir. 1968)).
The State's eight unobjected-to statements that its evidence was uncontradicted
or undisputed constituted fundamental error in violation of Mr. Scott's Fifth Amendment
right not to testify because they amounted to indirect comments on his decision not to
testify.

8.

The State's Arguments - Eight Times - That Its Evidence Was Uncontradicted
Or Undisputed Constituted Fundamental Error In Violation Of Mr. Scott's Fifth
Amendment Right Not To Testify
"Idaho follows the overwhelming

number of jurisdictions holding that a

prosecutor's general references to uncontradicted evidence do not necessarily reflect
on the defendant's failure to testify, where witnesses other than the defendant could
have contradicted the evidence." State v. McMurry, 143 Idaho 312, 314 (Ct. App. 2006)
(citing Lincoln v. Sunn, 807 F.2d 805, 810 (9 th Cir. 1987) and Raper v. Mintzes, 706
F.2d 161, 164 (6 th Cir. 1983)) (emphasis in original).

In Lincoln v. Sunn, the Court

noted, "Courts have distinguished between those cases in which the defendant is the
5

sole witness who could possibly offer evidence on a particular issue, and those cases in
which the information is available from other defense witnesses as well." Lincoln, 807
F.2d at 810.
In McMurry, the Court noted that whether a prosecutor's comments on the lack of
defense evidence contradicting the State's case can result in a Griffin violation
"depend[s] on the number and nature of those comments[,]" and that "[c]ourts uniformly
condemn this prosecutorial tactic due to the difficulty of determining whether Griffin
violations are constitutionally harmless." McMurry, 143 Idaho at 314-15 (citing Lincoln,

Raper, and U.S. v. Castillo, 866 F.2d 1071, 1084 (9 th Cir. 1989)).
In Raper, relied on by the Court in McMurry, the defendant was convicted of,

inter a/ia, the premeditated, first-degree murder of his estranged wife, Brenda. Raper,
706 F.2d at 162. The woman's boyfriend, Sam Kobel, was the only eyewitness, and
testified that Brenda answered the door when the defendant knocked, and that he heard
her ask "What are you doing here?" and "What do you have that for?" to which there
was no response. Id. Kobel then heard gunshots, ran toward Brenda, and saw her fall
to the ground.

Id.

The main issue of contention at trial was whether the murder of

Brenda was premeditated, with defense counsel arguing that it was possible that the
defendant went to the house to throw Kobel out (by threatening him with the gun), and
that he only killed Brenda in a moment of rage. Id. at 165.
The prosecutor, in his rebuttal closing argument, repeatedly stated that the
testimony of what happened was uncontradicted.

Id. at 165-66.

The prosecutor's

argument included stating, 'The facts were presented, and no one contradicted anything
that Sam Kobel said. No witness contradicted it. The physical facts don't contradict it."

Id. at 165. The prosecutor went on to argue, "His testimony has just not been refuted.
6

It's not been contradicted." Id.
Samuel Kobel's testimony.

Later, the prosecutor argued, "Let's look at Howard

No one's disputed it in any sense ... No one, no one

witness has contradicted the testimony, the events of that evening as relayed to you by
Sam Kobel." 6 Id. at 166.
Although the prosecutor's comments did not directly state that the defendant had
not testified, the Court nonetheless held that it was "unable to conceive of any other
reasonable inference which could be drawn from the prosecutor's comments)! because
only the defendant could have contradicted the government's evidence. 706 F.2d at
166-67.

The Court also found it significant that the prosecutor "made at least five

indirect references to the [defendant]'s failure to testify." Id. at 167. Ultimately, the
Court concluded that "the fact that the prosecutor made repeated comments about the
uncontradicted nature of the evidence is the dispositive factor in this case." Id. The
Court reversed the first degree murder conviction, finding that the error was not
harmless. Id. at 167.
In this case, only two people were present at the time of the purported drug
transaction: the police informant and Mr. Scott. Since the informant testified, that left
only one person who could have contradicted the evidence presented: Mr. Scott. The
State did not merely refer to its overall case as uncontroverted; rather it mentioned
specific instances and argued that the evidence was uncontroverted or undisputed at
least eight times. The following are the eight instances from the State's closing and
rebuttal arguments in which the prosecutor indirectly commented on Mr. Scott's silence:
The evidence is undisputed, uncontradicted that this controlled buy
happened on that date.
6

In Raper, as in Mr. Scott's case, the prosecutor's comments were not objected to by
defense counsel. Raper, 706 F.2d at 163.
7

(Supp.Tr., p.29, Ls.19-29.)
Number two, in the State of Idaho. That evidence is also uncontradicted.
It was confirmed by a number of witnesses that the controlled buy
happened in Cassia County, in the city of Burley, in the State of Idaho,
even narrowed down to almost the exact place on 13th Street where the
controlled buy happened.
(Supp.Tr., p.29, L.22 - p.30, L.3.)
The only evidence before you is that the substance in question was
methamphetamine ... [T]hat point is essentially undisputed.
(Supp.Tr., p.30, Ls.12-21.)

Also contained within point number three, that it was William Scott, the
defendant in this case, that delivered that methamphetamine.
That
evidence also is uncontradicted and undisputed. Every witness who had
any connection to this case as far as the controlled buy or the surveillance
connected William Scott to that controlled buy in some way. First of all,
Theresa Staker, very brave initially working as a confidential informant,
but, of course, because the case had to go to trial, her name had to be
divulged. She had to testify publicly. Certainly was no longer confidential.
She had to face Mr. Scott, the man who sold her that methamphetamine,
and identify him publically in court. She did that, and that identification
was undisputed.
(Supp.Tr., p.30, L.22 - p.31, L.12.)
Her testimony, again, is that he sold her or delivered her
methamphetamine, and there is no evidence to contradict that. In fact, all
of the other evidence introduced in this trial corroborates or supports her
testimony.
(Supp.Tr., p.31, Ls.20-24.)
Instruction Number 16 will be the next big question, and that is very
straightforward, very simple, and that is simply whether the delivery
occurred within 1,000 feet of the property of any public or private, primary
or secondary school. Again, the evidence was completely uncontradicted.
(Supp.Tr., p.36, Ls.1-6.)
She was being honest. She was telling you what happened, and that
evidence is uncontradicted.
(Supp.Tr., p.49, Ls.9-11.)
8

She was under oath. She promised to tell the truth, and there was [no]7
evidence to contradict that.
(Supp.Tr., p.50, Ls.5-7.)
The misconduct engaged in by the State in its closing and rebuttal arguments is
just what appellate courts have been concerned about since Griffin. As the Court of
Appeals noted in McMurry, "courts uniformly condemn this prosecutorial tactic due to
the difficulty of determining whether Griffin violations are constitutionally harmless."
McMurry, 143 Idaho at 314-15.

The two key considerations when determining whether a violation has occurred
are the "number and nature of those comments." Id. In this case, the number of the
comments, eight, is substantial. This is two more than in Raper, cited by the Court in
McMurry, and in McMurry itself, in which the Court found four 8 indirect references to the

defendant's silence. See also U.S. v. Flannery, 451 F.2d 880, 882 (1 st Cir. 1971) (Three
unobjected

to

comments

by the

prosecutor that

a

witness'

testimony

was

"uncontradicted" required reversal); Rodriguez-Sandoval v. U.S., 409 F.2d 529, 531 (1 st
Cir. 1969) (Five unobjected to comments by the prosecutor that the government's
version was uncontradicted constituted plain error and required reversal).
As for the nature of the comments, they were indirect references to Mr. Scott's
decision not to testify by their nature because he was the only witness who could have
contradicted the evidence presented and discussed by the State. See McMurry, 143
Idaho at 315 ("Comment on the absence of evidence contradicting the state's case is

7

The transcript appears to be missing the word "no" at this point.
The Court of Appeals explained that McMurry challenged three statements made by
the prosecutor, all of which had been objected to at trial; the Court itself located and
discussed a fourth improper comment that was not the subject of an objection. Id. at
315-16.
8

9

particularly problematic where the defendant is the sole witness who would be able to
contradict the evidence in question." (emphasis in original)) (citing People v. Hughes, 39
P.3d 432 (Cal. 2002); Hughes, 39 P.3d at 487 ("Pursuant to Griffin, it is error for a
prosecutor to state that certain evidence is uncontradicted or unrefuted when the
evidence could not be contradicted or refuted by anyone other than the defendant
testifying on his or her own behalf."); State v. Scutchings, 759 N.W.2d 729, 732 (N.O.
2009) ("[l]t is well established that a prosecutor's comment that the government's
evidence is uncontradicted or unrebutted is improper and violates the Griffin rule if the
only person who could have rebutted the evidence was the defendant testifying on his
or her own behalf." (citations omitted)); State v. Padilla, 552 P.2d 357, 362-63 (Haw.
1976) ("The prosecution is entitled to call attention to the fact that the testimony of the
witnesses for the prosecution has not been controverted, unless the circumstance that
the defendant is the only one who could possibly contradict that testimony would
necessarily direct the jury's attention solely to the defendant's failure to testify."
(citations omitted)); J. Evans, Annotation, Comment or Argument by Court or Counsel

that Prosecution Evidence is Uncontradicted as Amounting to Improper Reference to
Accused's Failure to Testify, 14 A.L.R. 3d 723, II.§ 4 (1967) 9 ("Where a trial judge or a
prosecuting

attorney

remarks

that

evidence

offered

by

the

prosecution

is

uncontradicted, and where defendant is the only person who could or would have
contradicted the evidence, it is generally held that the comment refers to defendant's
failure to testify and is thus improper.").

9

This A.LR. was cited by the Court of Appeals in McMurry. See McMurry, 143 Idaho at
315.
10

Although the prosecutorial misconduct in this case was not objected to by
defense counsel, Mr. Scott asserts that it constituted fundamental error requiring
reversal of his conviction. In State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209 (2010), the Idaho Supreme
Court set forth a new standard of review for unobjected to error, explaining:
If the alleged error was not followed by a contemporaneous objection, it
shall only be reviewed by an appellate court under Idaho's fundamental
error doctrine. Such review includes a three-prong inquiry wherein the
defendant bears the burden of persuading the appellate court that the
alleged error: (1) violates one or more of the defendant's unwaived
constitutional rights; (2) plainly exists; and (3) was not harmless. If the
defendant persuades the appellate court that the complained of error
satisfies this three-prong inquiry, then the appellate court shall vacate and
remand.

Id. at 228.
With respect to the first prong, the prosecutorial misconduct violated Mr. Scott's
Fifth Amendment right, incorporated against the States through the Fourteenth
Amendment, not to testify. As for the second prong, it is plain from the record, as the
prosecutor uses the terminology - uncontradicted or undisputed - disfavored by the
Court in McMurry and by other appellate courts considering the issue in a case in which
the defendant is the only witness who could have contradicted the State's evidence.
The third prong - establishing that the misconduct was not harmless - requires further
discussion.
In State v. DiGuilio, 491 So.2d 1129 (Fla. 1986), the Florida Supreme Court, in
adopting a harmless error test for prosecutorial comments on a defendant's silence (and
reversing its precedent that such errors required automatic reversal), nonetheless
explained that "comments on silence are high risk errors because there is a substantial
likelihood that meaningful comments will vitiate the right to a fair trial by influencing the
jury verdict[.}"

State v. DiGuilio, 491 So.2d 1129 (Fla. 1986).
11

With respect to the

application of a harmless error standard, 10 the Court, adopting the reasoning of former
Chief Justice Traynor of the California Supreme Court, cautioned,
that harmless error analysis must not become a device whereby the
appellate court substitutes itself for the jury, examines the permissible
evidence, excludes the impermissible evidence, and determines that the
evidence of guilt is sufficient or even overwhelming based on the
permissible evidence . In a pertinent passage , Chief Justice Traynor
points out:
Overwhelming evidence of guilt does not negate the fact that an
error that constituted a substantial part of the prosecution's case
may have played a substantial part in the jury's deliberation and
thus contributed to the actual verdict reached , for the jury may have
reached its verdict because of the error without considering other
reasons untainted by error that would have supported the same
result.
Id. at 1136 (quoting People v. Ross, 429 P.2d 606 , 621 (Cal. 1967) (Traynor, C.J.

dissenting)).
In this case, to satisfy the third prong of the Perry test, Mr. Scott need only show
a "reasonable possibility that the error affected the outcome of the trial. " Perry, 150
Idaho at 978. Considering that this case was based almost exclusively on the testimony
of one drug-addicted, drug-dealing police informant, and that Mr. Scott was the only
person whose testimony could have contradicted the testimony of the informant,
Mr. Scott submits that there is a reasonable possibility that the State's eight indirect
references to his failure to testify affected the outcome of the trial.
Based on the fundamental error present in his case, which deprived him of his
Fifth Amendment right to silence , Mr. Scott asserts that this Court must reverse the
judgment of conviction , and remand his case to the district court for a new trial.

10

The Florida Supreme Court adopted the harmless error standard set forth in
Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967), which differs from the Perry test in that,
under Chapman, the prosecution bears the burden of proving beyond a reasonable
doubt that the error did not contribute to the verdict.
12

CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth herein, Mr. Scott respectfully requests that this Court
vacate the judgment of conviction, and remand this matter to the district court for a new
trial.
DATED this 20 th day of September, 2011.

J. HAHN
te Appellate Public Defender
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